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11 December 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL CABELL

SUBJECT: Letter from your Friend

1. Your friend indeed has passed through a frustrating experience. He was a pioneer in this undertaking and to me it was only normal for him to encounter unusual situations which he was expected to solve with a minimum of guidance, or no guidance at all. Some of the factors contributing to his experiences are as follows:

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a. War planning can be said to have been recognized by this Agency in July 1952 when the merging of the PP, PM, and FI activities was directed. The Paramilitary (PM) Staff came into being with functions of both war planning and cold war PM operations. Organization recruiting and training was conducted during the fall of 1952 and the spring of 1953. The initial war planners were sent overseas by the PM Staff in the spring of 1953. (Colonel [REDACTED] USMC, head of the War Plans Group/Europe, assumed his duties in March 1953.) Your friend came to the Agency in July 1953, and was dispatched overseas as the first representative of the PM Staff to his Headquarters in May 1954. His immediate supervisor was [REDACTED] and General Truscott was in overall command.

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b. The PM Staff was dissolved in July 1954, the planning function being assumed by the PPC Staff and the operating function being assumed by the PP Staff. Even though these functions had been established for two years, practically no common doctrine or procedure had been agreed to. Headquarters and the field were both in the reconnaissance stage. Both took action in what each thought was in the best interests of the Agency.

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c. A common understanding did not exist within the DD/P area. A common understanding did not exist within and between the military services. A common understanding did not exist between this Agency and the military services particularly as to their requirements and our capabilities to fulfill them.

d. Progress in solving these problems was not apparent except to a very few who would not be diverted from the effort. It was not until the spring of 1955 that we saw our first ray of light and since then there has followed a series of events which permit us now to be more optimistic for a satisfactory outcome of our war planning exercise.

2. Important events since the spring of 1955 are as follows:

a. May 1955. General Truscott and his staff met with General Cooke and his staff and agreed that all EUCOM tentative requirements (800 Unconventional Warfare and 832 Espionage) would be drastically scaled down and made more realistic.

b. May 1955. A team of planners, representing the FE Division, War Plans Division and Senior War Planner, Pacific, visited their field stations and started the preparation of the first CIA Country War Plans.

c. August 1955. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, at the request of the Secretary of Defense, undertook a world-wide review of all UW requirements placed upon this Agency.

d. October 1955. The Director of Central Intelligence sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Criteria for Determination of Wartime Military Requirements for Clandestine Operations," setting forth the CIA concept of its role in clandestine support of wartime military operations.

e. July 1956. The new world-wide UW requirements were received from the Joint Chiefs of Staff in terms, for the most part, of the CIA criteria, and the new military area concept.

f. December 1956. This Agency is almost ready to dispatch to the Joint Chiefs of Staff the acceptances of the latest "Basket" of military requirements considering both our present and programmed capabilities.

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3. Conclusion:

Your friend went to his position overseas without adequate guidance simply because there was no firm guidance to furnish him. He was a pioneer developing his own means and reporting results to his Headquarters. His overseas guidance was also meager as most of the time he was far removed from his controlling Headquarters. His own military Headquarters asked him for assistance which was unrealistic because they did not know what our capabilities were and your friend did not know and could not find out. As he says, "attempt is being made to plan for things that cannot be done." He is correct but what he does not know is that all of the plans that he is aware of have been discarded and a fresh start made. He states that "in most cases no one has any serious intention of trying to do" anything. Again, he is correct because he undoubtedly knew that our area division responsible for the area in which his Headquarters was located refused to accept any of the numerous requirements passed informally to this Agency under the concepts in vogue before 1956. He, of course, does not know that the same division has now accepted 90% of the military requirements placed upon this Agency under the present accepted concepts. He states "the effect would be dangerous were the military led to expect that anything tangible would come of our PM activities in this theater." Our present planning is not limited to PM activities but embraces every cold war asset we have in being regardless of its cold war purpose, FI, PP, or PM. When the Joint Chiefs of Staff receives our formal reply they can judge whether or not our capabilities are useful adjuncts to a military effort. Some of us believe they will prove most useful once the military determines how best to use them. Your friend is, of course, thinking only in terms of developing paramilitary-type assets while as a matter of fact we are now proposing the use of all assets in being to aid the war effort which is a far different picture than the narrow PM view still restricting the thinking in some circles. Since my visit last summer to the various Headquarters, I am convinced that we do not need a planning representative with Army, Navy, and Air Force Commands in Europe, and when the present incumbents are due home we probably will not replace them as we have adequate liaison with these commands through our Chiefs of Station.

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4. Recommendation:

That you inform this young officer that his comments have been considered and that we desire to offer him a thorough briefing when he returns to Washington.

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**Chief, Planning and Program
Coordination Staff**

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